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  In Norway specialized health services are provided both by public hospitals and by privately 
practicing specialists who have a contract with the public sector. Patients’ co-payment is the same 
irrespective of the type of provider they visit.   The ambition of equity in the allocation of medical care is 
high among all political parties. The instruments for auditing whether these goals are fulfilled are not 
equally ambitious. The objective of the present study is to explore whether laws and regulations that 
govern the allocation of specialist health care resources in fact are fulfilled. Panel data from the Survey of 
Living Conditions are merged with data on capacity and spatial access to primary and specialist care. We 
find that accessibility and socio-economic variables play a considerable role in determining both the 
probability of at least one visit and the number of visits to a private specialist. A person with a higher 
university degree living in a municipality with the highest value of the geographical accessibility index 
has a 46%-points higher probability of at least one visit to a private specialist compared with a person 
with junior high living in a municipality with the lowest value of the accessibility index. With regard to 
visits to a hospital outpatient department these variables are not found to have significant effects.   
  We conclude that public ambitions and regulations are fulfilled for specialist services provided 
by public hospitals. With regard to the provision of services provided by publicly financed private 




In publicly financed health service systems the unpredictability of the quality of health 
care has been well known for a long time. In national health care systems, as in Great 
Britain and the Nordic countries, people do not have individual contracts that specify 
what they should expect from their health service. In these countries priority assignment 
of patients is determined by the parliament in terms of laws and regulations. For 
instance in Norway, the Act on Patient Rights states that the allocation of health 
services should be determined by a combination of the seriousness of a patient’s illness, 
the expected health gain of treatment and the health effect relative to the cost of 
treatment. The Act on Health Enterprises
3 states that the aim of the health enterprises is 
to provide high quality specialist health care on an equitable basis to patients in need, 
irrespective of age, sex, place of residence, material resources and ethnic background. 
 
In this paper we use a population-based survey to study to what extent the aim of the 
health enterprises according to the law is fulfilled. Our data allow us to consider a broad 
selection of individual patient characteristics since we use Survey of Living Conditions 
data merged with data on capacity and spatial access to primary and specialist care. 
Hence, the present study takes account of a full range of factors that could potentially 
influence the variation in utilization rates between individuals. We distinguish between 
visits to hospital outpatient departments and visits to private specialists financed by the 
National Insurance Scheme. We also empirically distinguish between access and 
utilization. 
 
In a previous study (Iversen and Kopperud, 2003) we find from cross-section data that a 
person’s self-assessed health contributes to the probability of outpatient visits and 
inpatient stays in the sense that poorer health increases the probability of use. The 
probability of visits to a private specialist is, however, less influenced by a person’s 
self-assessed health. We also find that geographical access seems to influence the use of 
private specialists, but not the use of public hospitals. Objections could be raised against 
                                                 
3 Health Enterprises are independent state-owned enterprises responsible for providing hospital services 
and other specialist health care to the population.  
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the cross-section data employed in that study.  A serious one is the fact that health 
assessment is carried out at the time a person is interviewed, while the registration of 
medical care use relates to the twelve months preceding the interview. Hence, a person 
in good health now may previously have been in poor health and recovered after 
treatment. This indicates an insignificant relationship between health status and use of 
specialist care, according to the sequence of data registration. We cannot rule out the 
possibility that our missing relationship between health and utilization in the private 
sector is caused by a higher probability of gaining health in the private sector compared 
with the public sector. A closer study of this question requires panel data where health 
assessment and health care utilization are registered in an appropriate sequence.  
 
In the study presented in this paper we have access to panel data from the Norwegian 
Survey of Living Conditions. Hence, we now possess data that show self-assessed 
health prior to the use of health services. Our main empirical results are that the 
probability of at least one visit to a hospital outpatient department depends on a 
patient’s self-assessed health as predicted. Again, we find that the geographical access 
to the hospital does not have any impact on the use of outpatient services. Also, the 
probability of at least one visit to a private specialist depends on a patient’s self-
assessed health. In addition, the estimated probability is positively influenced by a 
person’s level of education and geographical access to private specialists. In the 
concluding remarks we discuss the policy implications of our findings and in particular 
the need for setting up systems for auditing the implementation of public decisions. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional framework. Section 
3 presents the data. In Section 4 the estimation methods and empirical results are 




2. INSTITUTIONAL  FRAMEWORK 
Norway has a national health service. The parliament decides the institutional 
framework with regard to financing, ownership, and allocation of resources to the health 
sector and within the sector. The data that are used in the present study are from 1998- 
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2000. During that period each county council is responsible for the financing, planning 
and provision of specialized health care
4. Hospitals are financed by a mix of fixed 
budget and per case funding of outpatient and inpatient treatments. Patient co-payment 
is requested for outpatient treatment, but not for inpatient stays.  
 
Private specialists also provide specialist health care. About 10 % of physicians engaged 
in specialist health care are in private practice. The proportion of specialist consultations 
that is taken care of be the private specialists is not known at the national level, but a 
rough guess is 20 per cent.  Since 1 July 1998, funding from the National Insurance 
Scheme requires that a privately practicing physician has a contract with a county 
council (after 1 January 2002 with an appropriate regional health enterprise). The 
practice income of a contract physician is partly from a practice allowance and partly 
from a fee-for-service component, where a patient co-payment is included. About two 
third of a contract specialist’s practice income is expected to come from public funding. 
The patient’s co-payment is independent of whether he is treated at a hospital outpatient 
department or by a contract specialist, and was about 20 USD per consultation at the 
time of data collection. Specialists without a contract are mainly located in the biggest 
cities and receive their total practice income directly from their patients. Hence, patients 
are likely to pay a considerably higher co-payment per consultation to a specialist 
without a contract compared with a hospital outpatient department or with a contract 
specialist. Although the exact number of specialists without a contract is not known, 
they are a tiny proportion of the total number of practicing physician specialists.    
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of contracts with private specialists and the distribution 




From Table 1 we see that the centrally located enterprise Health East has just below one 
half of the total number of contracts and are responsible for specialist services to just 
above 1/3 of the country’s population.  On the other hand, Health North has 6% of the 
                                                 
4 From 1 January 2002 the state took over the ownership of hospitals and other specialist health services and 
thereby the responsibility for providing specialized health care to all Norwegian residents through the 
establishment of five regional health enterprises.  
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total number of contracts and is responsible for 10% of the county’s population. Hence, 
with a skewed distribution of specialist contracts towards urban parts of the country, we 
suspect that also the use of the specialists’ services is skewed towards patients living in 
urban areas. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that patients living in rural 
areas are traveling to urban areas to see a specialist and hence, evening out the 
distribution of actual use of services according to patients’ municipality of residence. 
Nor can we rule out the possibility that patients living in rural areas are more likely to 
visit a hospital outpatient department, and hence even out the total use of specialist 
services between urban and rural areas.  Accordingly, in order to study whether the laws 
that prescribe the allocation of health services are fulfilled, we need to analyze data on 
the population’s actual use of health services.     
 
The observed utilization pattern of specialist services is a result of an interaction 
between several decision-makers with separate objectives and constraints. Figure 1 




For non-emergency care, an individual with symptoms of a disease usually visits a 
general practitioner (GP). GPs are either employed by or have a contract with a 
municipality, the lowest level of government. GPs are located in their own offices, and 
the distance to a private specialist or a hospital may well be long in remote areas of the 
country.   According to Figure 1, the GP may treat the patient himself or send a referral 
to a private specialist, a hospital outpatient department or admit the patient to an 
inpatient stay. The patient may also contact a specialist directly, since the role of the GP 
as a gatekeeper is not strictly adhered to. After treatment in the specialist sector, the 
patient may be referred back to general practice or to self-care.  
 
Hence, there are four decision-makers determining a patient’s use of specialist care: the 
patient himself, his GP, the private specialist and doctors at the public hospital. They 
have their specific preferences and constraints. The patient is assumed to have a 
preference for his own health, income and leisure, as standard in the health economics 
literature. Important constraints are time and income constraints and the production 
function for health. The GP is assumed to have preferences for his patients’ health, and  
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his own income and effort (negative). He is also constrained by his budget, where 
income and cost components depend on the remuneration system imposed, and his time 
constraint. His decision variables are the kind of treatment he should initiate for each of 
his patients, including whether he should refer the patient to a private specialist or a 
hospital. We assume that the private specialist has the same kind of preferences as the 
general practitioner. Also for him the decision variables are the kind of treatment he 
should initiate for his patients, including whether he should refer a patient to a hospital 
or recommend further treatment in general practice. At the hospital level, physicians are 
salaried. Hence, their income is independent of the clinical decisions they make, 
although income and costs for the hospital may be affected. We assume that salaried 
hospital doctors have preferences for patients’ health and own effort (negative) and that 
their decisions are compatible with the hospital’s budget constraint. Visits to a hospital 
outpatient department and inpatient stays are rationed in the sense that a patient usually 
needs a referral to gain access to these services. A referral usually precedes a 
consultation with a private specialist too, but for some conditions a referral is not 
required. Some diagnostic and curative services are only provided by hospitals. The 
crucial decision variable for a hospital consultant is the kind of treatment that should be 
prescribed for each of the patients who are referred to the hospital. Alternative decisions 
are to admit the patient immediately as an inpatient or outpatient, put him on a waiting 
list or refer the patient back to general practice.  
 
We highlight three groups of variables that contribute to whether a patient ends up with 
a consultation in private or specialist care or is treated by the GP he initially contacted. 
 
The patient’s health and type of medical problem 
According to the Act on Patient Rights, the GP should consider the seriousness of the 
patient’s illness, the expected health gain from further examination and treatment and 
the expected health effect relative to the cost of treatment when he/she decides on 
means of treatment. The GP’s consideration of the patient’s health status and potential 
for improvement is therefore crucial. 
 
Capacity  in general practice 
We suggest that GPs are more inclined to refer patients to special health care the lower 
physician density in general practice in a local area is. The reason is that a low  
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physician density implies a high opportunity cost of providing services in terms of 
fewer patients that can be seen.  
 
Capacity, organization and remuneration in the specialist sector 
A low capacity in the specialist sector may imply a long waiting time for the patient or a 
high probability of having a referral rejected. A patient may therefore be better off by 
staying with the GP. Long travelling distances for seeing the specialist points in the 
same direction. Our data do not contain information about referrals. Hence, we cannot 
distinguish between contacts with and without referrals in the empirical section.  
 
Since rationing
5 occurs to a greater extent in hospitals than in private practice, we would 
expect that patients’ health status on average is better in private practice than in public 
hospitals. On the other hand, if GPs are worried about the waiting time patients may 
experience in hospitals, they may be likely to refer even patients with poor health to 
private specialists. A priori we therefore cannot conclude whether patients’ health is 
expected to be better in private practice than in hospital outpatient departments. For 
both types of providers we can, however, predict that a decline in a person’s health 
status should increase the likelihood of a visit if providers adhere to the national 
guidelines of prioritization.  
 
   
3.  DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Our data set is obtained by merging data from three different sources. The main file is 
from the Survey of Living Conditions conducted by Statistics Norway and consists of 
panel data for the years 1998-2000. The panel contains 5308 respondents from the 
Norwegian population, aged 16 and older. The sample is representative with respect to 
sex, age, marital status and geographical region. When a person drops out of the panel, 
another person from the population replaces him or her. Hence, the total panel is not 
represented in every year. In our analysis there are observations in terms of interview 
data and register data of 3501 individuals. In addition to health-related information, the 
survey also includes information on various living conditions, education, income, 
                                                 
5 By rationing we mean that some patients are turned down or offered a very long wait.   
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employment, etc. 
   
The second source is the Commune Database, which contains statistics since 1769 for 
all 435 municipalities in Norway. The database covers demographic and occupational 
information, welfare-related statistics and data on provision of public services. More 
than 190 000 variables are available for each municipal unit.   
 
The third data source is an index that describes the accessibility of specialized health 
care in Norway at the municipal level (Kopperud, 2002). The construction of this index 
is inspired by the work of Carr-Hill et al. (1994). The specialist care included is 
hospitals (outpatient and inpatient care) and privately practicing physician specialists 
with a contract with a county council. The index measures the availability of specialized 
health care in each municipality within each of the five health regions. Three elements 
are incorporated in the index: the capacity of the specialized health care in each 
municipality where the service is provided, the distance from a municipality to be 
served to the municipality where the service is provided, and a discount factor that 
converts the distance to estimated access. The capacity is measured along three 
dimensions: hospital beds, hospital physicians and private specialists.  
 
The joint accessibility  ikr A  for the residents in municipality i in county k in region r is: 





k r n n
ikr j ij j ij j ij
jj j kr
Ac S f d S f d S f d
PP P == =

=+ + 
 ∑∑ ∑   
    
where  k P  is the population in countyk ,  r P  is the population in region r , and P  is the 
total population in Norway. There are  k n  municipalities in countyk ,  r n  municipalities 
in region r  and 435 municipalities in Norway, where 435 kr nn < < . 
(1)
j S  is the capacity 
of the county level specialist health care in municipality j . 
(2)
j S  is the capacity of the 
regional level specialist health care in municipality j . 
(3)
j S  is the capacity of the national 
level specialist health care in municipality j . Capacity is measured along one of the 
dimensions hospital beds, hospital physicians and private specialists, all per capita at the 
relevant geographical level.   ij d  is the distance between a municipality  j  with a health  
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care facility, and the municipality i to be served.  ( ) ij f d  expresses the effect of 
distance on access. Distance is measured in travel time by car from one municipal 
center to another
6. Since in fact faster modes of transportation are used for longer 
distances (airplanes), access is assumed to decline with distance at an increasing rate 
(negative first order derivative and positive second order derivative)
 7.  c is a constant. 
The accessibility index is further described in the Appendix. We emphasize that there is 
no obvious choice of the functional form of  ( ) ij f d . Hence, we have tried various 
specifications of the functional form of  ( ) ij f d that satisfy the conditions of negative 
first order derivative and positive second order derivative.  Our results seem to be robust 




Table 2 shows the three estimated measures of the accessibility of specialized health 
care: one estimated accessibility index for hospital beds, one for hospital physicians and 
one for privately practicing specialists. In our sample, the access to specialized health 
care is on average higher than for the average municipality in the country, normalized to 
zero. The reason is that although our sample is representative of the population, it may 
not be representative of the municipalities. Smaller municipalities with relatively poor 
access are likely to be underrepresented in the sample. The index is on average 1.7 for 
access to hospital beds, 1.9 to physicians in hospitals, and 2.3 to private specialists. The 
accessibility index for those who have visited a private specialist is higher according to 




Data on utilization of health care are the figures provided by the respondents of the 
                                                 
6 InfoMap Norge AS provided the distance matrix. We have also used an alternative matrix with distance  
measured in kilometers.  Our results  turn out  not to be sensitive to the choice made.  
7 This means that the first order derivative is negative ( ) 0 ij fd ′ < , and the second order derivative is 
positive: ()0 ij fd ′′ > .  
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Survey of Living Conditions. We consider two measures of utilization of specialist care: 
visits to privately practicing specialists
8 and hospital outpatient visits. During the last 
12 months, 17% of the sample has had one or more visits to a private specialist while 
19% of the sample has had at least one outpatient hospital visit. Among those who had 
at least one visit to a private specialist, the average number of visits is 2.34, respectively 
2.58 for visits to a hospital outpatient department. The distribution is skewed to the right 
(skewness=13.7 and 11.9, respectively). A rather small proportion of the sample 
consumes a large number of health services. Our data do not contain the number of 
hospital inpatient stays during the observation period.  
 
The density of general practitioners at the municipal level is measured by the ratio GPs 
per 10,000 residents, and is a measure of the capacity in primary care in the residential 
municipality. The average GP ratio is 7.79 per 10,000 residents. 24% of the respondents 
have a regular health center and 60% have a personal GP.  
 
Because of the long recall period (12 months), the reported number of visits may 
contain recall bias. In addition, the data contain no information on the total number of 
visits according to completed illness spells. It is likely that the data include incomplete 
spells. Some of the visits may be the result of an illness spell that started before the 
observation period, and counts may therefore be misinterpreted as first contacts. Some 
of the illness episodes may also continue after the observation period. As a result, the 
distribution of the number of visits may be mixed with left, right and no truncation. 
Furthermore, contacts during the observation period may also be the result of several 
illness episodes and accordingly several first contacts. 
 
Health status 
The indicator of health care need is self-assessed health and chronic illnesses
9. Self-
assessed health is measured as a five-point health status scale: very good, good, fair, 
bad and very bad. In the whole sample, 76% state that they have very good or good 
health, although 31% report that they suffer from a chronic illness.  
                                                 
8 These physicians are privately practicing and may or may not have a contract with the county council that entitles 
them to a practice allowance.   
9 Due to insufficient data we do not take the capacity to benefit into consideration, and in general expose ourselves to 




The sample is made up of 52% women, and the average age is 44.6 years. 26% of the 




4.  ESTIMATION METHODS AND RESULTS 
First, we estimate the probability of at least one contact for each type of specialized 
health care: visits to private specialists and hospital outpatient visits. Next, we examine 
what determines the number of visits to private specialists and hospital outpatient 
departments, respectively.  
 
In the literature it is usual to distinguish between the first contact during an episode of 
illness and subsequent contacts. While the patient initiates the first contact, the 
physician (agent) in agreement with the patient (principal) initiates subsequent contacts. 
Hence, there may be different types of factors that influence the first contact compared 
with subsequent contacts. Recent contributions to the literature have aimed at 
distinguishing between the two kinds of decisions in the estimation procedure. As a 
consequence of the rejection of the single spell assumption in our data set, we are not 
able to distinguish between the contact decision and the follow-up decision in our 
analysis.  Hence, our data do not allow us to interpret the first contact as the patient’s 
decision and subsequent contacts as a provider’s decision. The analysis is therefore 
confined to estimating the factors that influence the utilization of specialist services 
without distinguishing between patients’ and providers’ decisions. We use the software 
Limdep 8.0 in estimating the models.   
  
When examining the factors that contribute to at least one contact, we consider a 
discrete dependent variable, Y , that shows whether an individual is a “non-user” 
( 0 Y = ), a “user of private specialist services” ( 1 Y = ), a “user of public hospital 
outpatient services” ( 2 Y = ) or a “user of both types of specialist services” ( 3 Y = ). 
Assuming a logistically distributed error term, the probability of being a “user of type j” 
                                                 



















, where vector x contains explanatory variables, βj 
(j=1,2,3) are coefficients to be estimated, and j=0 is the reference. The estimated βs are 
found from the maximization of the log likelihood function.  
 
The multinomial logit model relies on the Independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
condition. To check whether this condition is fulfilled we have also estimated the model 
when one option of specialist care is removed (for instance receiving care from both 
hospitals and private specialists). The estimated coefficients of the remaining options 
are robust with regard to this removal. Hence, we conclude that the IIA condition is 
fulfilled.   
 
The dependent variable in the second part of the analysis measures the number of visits 
to a privately practicing physician during the last 12 months, and the number of 
hospital outpatient visits during the last 12 months
11. Count data regression models 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) are used since the dependent variable is measured as non-
negative integer counts. We start with the standard Poisson distribution. An important 
property of the Poisson model is that the mean equals the variance. This assumption is 
sometimes too restrictive (Mullahy, 1997). We see from Table 2 that in our case the 
variance exceeds the mean to a considerable extent. Hence, the negative binomial 
model, which allows for over-dispersion, i.e. the variance to differ from the mean 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 1998), is also estimated. We test the Poisson models for over-
dispersion according to Cameron and Trivedi (1990). The loglikelihood ratio when 
testing the negative binomial (NB) model against the Poisson model, is 1672.97 (the 
number of visits to a privately practicing physician during the last 12 months) and 
2915.83 (the number of hospital outpatient visits during the last 12 months). The NB 
models increase the log likelihood significantly, and this leads to rejection of the 
Poisson models. The over-dispersion parameter alpha in the negative binomial models 
is positive and significant for both models. Hence, there is strong evidence of over-
dispersion and we continue with the NB models. 
                                                 
11 In the analysis of visits to private specialists we omitted an individual with 97 visits, and in the analysis of 
visits to hospitals we omitted an individual with 99 visits. We have reasons to believe that these figures are not 
real. If the individual with 97 visits is included in the analysis of visits to private specialists, the significant effect 




The results of the estimated models are shown in Table 3
12. We focus on the effect of 
self-assessed health, socio-demographic characteristics and access to health care on the 
use of specialist health care. The individuals’ self-assessed health is a dummy variable 
for each of the health conditions very good, good and fair. We further add a dummy 
variable for chronic illness. We have dummy variables for being a man, for age groups: 
31-50, 51-70 and over 70, and for education: high school, low university and high 
university degree. There is a dummy variable for individuals who have a personal GP, 
and individuals who have a regular health center. There are variables describing access 
to GPs and to specialized health care
13. In the model, the reference individual has very 
bad or bad self-assessed health, does not have a chronic illness, is a female between 16-
30 years of age, with highest degree from junior high, and does not have a personal GP 




Table 3 shows the marginal effects of the explanatory variables. We see  that the perceived 
health states very good, good and fair are found to negatively influence the use of private 
specialists and hospital outpatient departments at a statistically significant level compared 
with bad or very bad health. Also, chronic illness contributes positively to both types of 
visits.  
 
Being a man affects the probability of a visit negatively, while a higher degree 
contributes positively to a visit to a private specialist compared to junior high as highest 
degree. Having a high university degree increases the probability of at least one visit to 
a private specialist by 11 %-points at the margin compared with junior high as the 
highest degree. There is no effect of education on the occurrence of visits to public 
hospitals. Also household income has a positive impact on the use of private specialists, 
                                                 
12 The estimated model contains all four alternatives with (Y=0) as a reference. Table 3 only exhibits the effects 
on utilization of private specialists (Y=1) and hospital outpatient departments (Y=2).  




but not on the use of hospitals. The age effect is more uniform for hospitals than for 
private specialists in the sense that the oldest age group both has the highest probability 
of a visit and the highest number of visits. 
 
Individuals with a personal GP have a significantly (1%) higher probability of a visit to 
a hospital outpatient department.  We also find that the number of hospital outpatient 
visits increases with a personal GP (significant at 1%), and with having a regular health 
center (significant at 5%). These effects of an individual’s relations to primary care 
physicians are not found for the number of visits to private specialists.  
 
The higher the GP per resident ratio is, the lower are the probability of a visit and the 
number of visits to a private specialist (significant at 1%). These effects are not found 
for visits to hospital outpatient departments, and indicate that private specialists 
function as an alternative to primary care physicians. 
 
While there is no effect of accessibility on the probability of a visit to the hospital 
outpatient department, there is a positive impact of the accessibility index for private 
specialist on the probability of a visit to a private specialist. At the margin an increase 
of one point increases the probability of a visit by 1.2 %-points. This implies that other 
things equal, the probability of at least one visit is 10-15 %-points higher if you live in 
an urban area compared with the remote areas of the country. The effect of accessibility 
is also valid for the number of visits. 
 
In sum, we could say that accessibility and socio-economic variables play a 
considerable role in determining the probability of at least one visit and the number of 
visits to a private specialist. A person with fair health and a higher degree of university 
education living in a municipality with the highest value of the accessibility index has in 
fact 46%-points higher probability of at least one visit to a private specialist than a 
person with fair health and junior high living in a municipality with the lowest value of 
the accessibility index. With regard to visits to a hospital outpatient department these 
types of variables are not found to have significant effects.   
 
An interesting question is whether there is an effect of  the interaction between access 
and a patient’s health status. Another candidate is an interaction between health status  
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and education. We included these interaction variables without finding statistically 
significant effects. Hence, we dropped the interaction effects among the results 
displayed in Table 3. 
 
It should be mentioned that the predictive power of the model is moderate. Based on a 
threshold probability of 0.31 (the proportion of the sample who report any visit to 
specialist health care), 1634 of 2427 non-users and 648 of 1074 users of any specialist 
service are correctly predicted.  This result corresponds to a positive predicted value of 
0.45 and a negative predicted value of 0.79.   
  
Visits to private specialists are registered for the two subsequent years 1999 and 2000. 
Panel data may improve the estimation by increasing the number of observations per 
individual. Because of unobserved heterogeneity error terms are likely to be correlated 
over time. Unobserved heterogeneity could be handled also for models with discrete 
dependent variables (Green, 2003, 698). In this paper we have chosen a technically less 
complicated procedure. We have simply calculated the means of the dependent variable 
and the independent variables over the two years for each individual. Hence, the 
dependent variable indicating whether an individual has visited a private specialist now 
has three possible values: not visited, visited in one of the years and visited both years. 
This variable may be interpreted as observations, yi, of a latent continuous 
variable
*'























where µ0 and µ1 are threshold parameters to be estimated.   
 
Table 4 shows the results of the estimation of this ordered probit model. The sign of the 
statistically significant variables are similar to what we found when only the last period 





Table 4 also shows the effect of independent variables on the average annual number of 
visits during the last two years. Since this variable is considerably skewed to the right, a 
logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable is done and heteroscedasticity 
robust (White) estimators are obtained. The estimation produces statistically significant 




5. POLICY  IMPLICATIONS 
The motivation for this study has been to explore whether the laws and regulations that 
govern the allocation of health care resources are fulfilled. In Norway the ambitions of 
all political parties are high in this field, as seen by the laws approved by the parliament 
and described in the introductory section of this paper. In particular, an individual’s use 
of specialist health services should depend on the individual’s need and should not 
depend on age, sex, income, municipality of residence etc. Since politicians are often 
reluctant to give verifiable commitments, the instruments for auditing whether these 
goals are fulfilled are not equally ambitious. This is due both to the chance of alienating 
voters and to the chance of being held liable for broken promises. For instance, the Act 
on Patient Rights states that a patient has a right to treatment only if the expected health 
gain from treatment is reasonable compared with the cost of treatment. In order to judge 
whether a patient in fact has a right to be treated, we need to know what a reasonable 
relationship between effect and cost is. So far, no politician has been willing to be 
precise on this matter. On the contrary, politicians who approved the law label decision-
makers who ask for an upper limit as cold and cynical.  
 
As a result, reluctance to give commitments spills over to reluctance to initiate studies 
of whether laws and regulations are implemented. Since equity is a relative concept, an 
individual complaint is insufficient evidence to conclude that a system is inequitable 
according to its own standard of equity.  Hence, auditing requires systematic collection 
of data from hospital files and population surveys.  
                                                 
14 Care should be taken when considering the magnitude of the effects on the unlogged dependent 




In this paper we have used a data set constructed to shed light on whether laws and 
regulations in fact are implemented. This data set is made by merging survey data with 
data on geographical access to primary care and specialist care. We found that the use of 
hospital outpatient clinics was closely related to a person’s self-assessed health in the 
sense that poor health is likely to increase the use of hospital outpatient services. We 
found no effect of the access to specialist health care depending on a person’s 
municipality of residence. On the other hand, the use of private specialists was 
positively related to the geographical access to the specialists. Also a person’s level of 
education contributed positively to the use of private specialist services. 
 
For both types of services, an individual’s age and sex contributed to the use of 
specialist services. That men use health services to a lesser extent than women is well 
known from other studies (for instance, Elstad, 1991). That age has an effect in addition 
to self-assessed health may indicate that people’s perception of good health is 
influenced by their age. The effect of a personal GP might have been positive or 
negative depending on whether the GP’s role as his patient’s agent dominates the 
gatekeeper role. The positive effect on the use of hospital outpatient services means that 
the role as the patient’s agent dominates. This result corresponds to the findings in a 
recent Norwegian study (Carlsen and Norheim, 2003). It may also be that people in 
poor health to a greater extent have a personal GP compared with people in good health. 
Hence, health status and having a regular GP are likely to be correlated. We have 
therefore done sensitivity analysis. It turns out that the coefficients are stable 
irrespective of whether the regular GP variable is included or not.    
 
Our study adds to the literature of whether persons in equal need of treatment receive 
similar treatment regardless of their income, as reviewed by Wagstaff and van 
Doorslaer (2000). They conclude that there is growing evidence that, in the US, the 
distribution of health care by income is not consistent with health care being allocated 
according to need. There is some evidence that pro-poor inequities in inpatient care are 
compensating for pro-rich inequities in specialist and outpatient care. Within the EU 
countries Wagstaff and van Doorslaer do not find a straightforward link between the 
features of the system and the degree of inequity.  
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In short, the results of our study show that public ambitions and regulations seem to be 
fulfilled for the specialist services provided by the public hospitals. With regard to the 
provision of services provided by publicly financed private specialists we find a 
discrepancy between the public goals and the actual characteristics of the patients 
treated. In contrast to what the Act on Health Enterprises prescribes, the use of private 
specialists depends on education and municipality of residence.   
 
These findings have implications both for the regional health enterprises and for the 
institutions responsible for auditing the implementation and maintenance of public 
policy. The office of the Auditor General of Norway is the controlling agency of the 
Norwegian Parliament, and hence, the institution that is expected to verify whether laws 
and regulations are adhered to. Since the present study is rather broad, a follow-up could 
be a study of patient flows with more detailed information on activities and the 
composition of patients. If such a study confirms our results, the regional health 
enterprises are obliged to decentralize the location of private specialists or to make it 
less costly for patients in rural areas to visit private specialists. Another possible action 
would be to make the policy goals less ambitious with regard to equity. This alternative 
requires the parliament’s approval and is for obvious reasons not politically attractive, 
in particular in a country where rural interests have a strong impact on political 




Cameron, A. C., Trivedi, P. K., 1998.  Regression analysis of count data. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Cameron, A. C., Trivedi, P. K., 1990. Regression based tests for overdispersion in the 
Poisson model. Journal of Econometrics 46, 347-364. 
 
Carlsen, B., Norheim, O. F., 2003. Introduction of the patient-list system in general 
practice. Changes in Norwegian physicians’ perception of their gatekeeper role. 
Scandinavian Journal of Primary Health Care 21, 209-213. 
 
Carr-Hill, R. A., Hardmann, G., Martin, S., Peacock, S., Sheldon, T. A., Smith, P., 
1994.  A formula for distributing NHS revenues based on small area use of hospital 
beds. University of York: Centre for Health Economics. 
 
Elstad, J. I., 1991. Flere leger, større bruk? Artikler om bruk av allmennlegetjenester. 
INAS- Rapport 1991:11.  Oslo: Institutt for sosialforskning. 
 
Greene, W. H.,  2003. Econometric analysis. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.  
 
Goddard, M., Smith, P., 2001. Equity of access to health care services Theory and 
evidence from the UK.  Social Science and Medicine 53, 1149-1162. 
 
Hagget, D., Cliff, A. D., Frey, A., 1977. Locational models. London: Edward Arnold. 
 
Iversen, T., Kopperud, G S., 2003. The impact of accessibility on the use of specialist 
health care in Norway. Health Care Management Science 6, 249-261. 
 
Kopperud, G. S. 2002. Beregning av tilgjengelighetsindeks til spesialisthelsetjenester på 
kommunenivå. HERO Working paper 14/2002. Oslo: University of Oslo.  
  
  21
Manning, W. G., 1998. The logged dependent variable, heteroscedasticity, and the 
transformation problem. Journal of Health Economics 17, 283-295.  
 
Mullahy, J., 1997. Heterogeneity, excess zeros, and the structure of count data models. 
Journal of Applied Econometrics 12, 337-350. 
 
Wagstaff, A., Doorslaer, E., 2000. “Equity in health care finance and delivery.” In 
Handbook of health economics, edited by A. J. Culyer and J. P. Newhouse, pp. 1803-1862.  
Amsterdam: Elsevier.   
 














Table 1: Distribution of contracts with private specialists 2002 and distribution of 
















Distribution of private 
specialists 
48 %  18 %  17 %  10 %  6 %  100 % 




Table 2: Descriptive statistics - mean (standard deviation) of the variables.  
Variable Definition  Private 









Very good health   =1 Very good health  0.19  0.17  0.26 
Good health   =1 Good health  0.46  0.41  0.50 
Fair health  =1 Fair health  0.23  0.27  0.17 
Bad or very bad health   =1 Bad or very bad health  0.12  0.15  0.07 
Chronic illness  =1 if the person has a chronic illness  0.46  0.49  0.31 
Man  =1 if man  0.38  0.39  0.48 






Junior high  =1 if highest education is junior high  0.16  0.21  0.18 
High school  =1 if highest education is  high school   0.57  0.56  0.56 
University low  =1 if university degree after 3 years   0.21  0.21  0.21 
University high  =1 if university degree after 5 years or more 0.06  0.03  0.05 














Personal GP  =1 if the individual consider himself to 
have a personal GP.  0.68  0.69 
 
0.60 
Regular health center  =1 if individual sees a regular health center  0.21  0.23  0.24 
Hospital outpatient visits  =1 if individual has been at hospital for 
outpatient visits during the last 12 months   0.31  1 
 
0.19 
Number of hospital 
outpatient visits 
The number of hospital outpatient visits 







Visits to a private 
specialist  
=1 if individual has had at least one visit to 
a private specialist during the last 12 




Number of visits to 
private specialists 
The number of visits to privately specialists 















Access to hospital 
physician 








Access to private 
specialists 









Table 3: The estimated marginal effect of independent variables (t-values) on use 
of private specialists and hospital outpatient departments during last 12 months   
Multinomial logit model: 
Probability of at least one visit 
Negative binomial model: 










Constant  -0.06 (-1.5) -0.17** (-4.1) 0.11 (1.0)  -0.13 (-1.2)
Very good health  -0.08** (-3.4) -0.13** (-5.7) -0.41** (-6.7)  -0.61** (-5.7)
Good health  -0.05* (-2.2) -0.11** (-5.4) -0.30** (-5.6)  -0.49** (-7.8)
Fair health  -0.05* (-2.2) -0.06** (-2.9) -0.16** (-2.9)  -0.27** (-4.4)
Chronic illness  0.05** (3.9) 0.06** (4.4) 0.13** (4.2)  0.20** (5.5)
Man  -0.05** (-4.6) -0.04** (-3.4) -0.20** (-6.8)  -0.11** (-3.4)
High school  0.04* (2.4) 0.004 (0.3) 0.06 (1.4)  0.03 (0.8)
University low  0.04* (2.2) 0.02 (1.1) 0.03 (0.6)  0.05 (0.9)
University high  0.11**  (4.5) -0.03 (-0.8) 0.16** (2.3)  -0.05 (-0.5)
Age:31-50  0.001 (0.1) 0.04* (2.6) -0.04 (-1.1)  0.12** (2.7)
Age: 51-70  0.04* (2.5) 0.05* (2.5) 0.03 (0.7)  0.12* (2.5)
Age: 70<  0.02 (1.1) 0.06** (2.9) -0.02 (-0.3)  0.22** (3.6)
Household income in 
in NOK 100,000 
0.005** (2.9) 0.004 (1.5) 0.02** (2.9)   0.01 (0.8)
GPs per 10,000 
residents 
-0.02** (-3.9) 0.003 (0.8) -0.03** (-3.3)  -0.01 (-0.6)
Personal GP  0.03 (1.8) 0.07** (3.2) 0.01 (0.1)  0.16** (3.1)
Regular health center  0.02 (1.2) 0.07** (3.2) 0.001 (0.01)  0.12* (2.0)
Access to private 
specialists 
0.07** (3.2) -0.005 (-1.1) 0.03** (2.7)  0.003 (0.3)
Access to hospital 
physician 
-0.01 (-0.6) -0.01 (-0.6) 0.05 (1.2)  -0.03 (-0.6)
Access to hospital 
beds 
0.01 (0.8) 0.01 (0.8) -0.07 (-1.77)  0.02 (0.50)
Alpha  4.93** (13.93)    4.60** (15.31)






N  3501 3500  3501
*, (**) indicates that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the 5, (1) % level with a two-
tailed test.  
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Table 4: The estimated effect of independent variables (t-values) on the use of  private 
specialists during the last 12 months based on 1999 and 2000 surveys. 
 
Variables  Ordered probit model: No 
visits, visit in one of the two 
years, visits in both years 
Log Number of visits  
(heteroscedasticity 
robust estimates) 
Constant  -0.30* (-2.2) -7.26** (-11.3)
Very good health  -0.86** (-10.6) -5.28** (-11.4)
Good health  -0.65** (-8.7) -4.44** (-9.9)
Fair health  -0.38** (-4.4) -3.23** (-6.4)
Man  -0.20** (-6.3) -0.85** (-5.3)
High school  0.14** (2.9) 0.56* (2.5)
University low  0.25** (4.6) 1.18** (4.4)
University high  0.43** (5.1) 1.84** (4.3)
Age: 31-50  -0.01 (-0.2) -0.23 (-1.1)
Age: 51-70  0.15** (3.0) 0.43 (1.8)
Age: 70<  0.11 (1.6) 0.23 (0.7)
Household income in 
in NOK 100,000 
0.02** (5.2) 0.13** (6.7)
GPs per 10,000 residents  -0.02 (-1.5) -0.06 (-1.3)
Personal GP  0.43** (7.3) 1.99** (8.1)
Regular health center  0.18** (2.7) 0.81** (2.9)
Access to private 
specialists 
0.08** (6.8) 0.39** (6.8)
Access to hospital 
physician 
-0.08 (-1.8) -0.33 (-1.5)
Access to hospital beds  0.02 (0.48) 0.03 (0.14)
µ1  1.02** (43.38)
Log likelihood  -4854.41
R
2  0.07

















































Appendix: Measuring accessibility 
 
Norwegian health policy aims at providing equal access to health care, independent of 
economic status or geographical location. When examining variations in the utilization 
of specialist health care, we needed a measure of the perceived access to specialized 
health care. The perceived access to health care is estimated at the municipality level. 
As indicators of health service provision we used the number of effective beds available 
in hospitals, the number of physician man-years in hospitals, and the number of man-
years of privately practicing specialists in an office setting. Since the perceived 
accessibility is estimated according to the number of beds and man-years, the index is 
intended to capture the capacity and not the actual need in the population.  
 
An indicator of access to specialist health care at municipality level should contain both 
a measure of the capacity in the municipality in question, a measure of the supply in 
nearby municipalities, and the traveling distance to health care. Wilson (1974) described 
a spatial interaction model in developing a measure of the perceived accessibility: 
() ij i j ij Tg P S f c = , where  ij T  is the number of health care interactions between residential 
zone  i and destination  j .  i P  measures the effective population in zone i and  j S  
measures the attractiveness of destination  j .  ij c  is a measure of the distance between 
residential zone i and destination  j .  ( ) f ⋅  is a distance decay function and g  is a 
gravitational constant. Our estimation of the perceived accessibility index is based on 
Wilson (1974).  
 
In order to estimate the perceived accessibility of specialized health care for each 
municipality ( j ;  1,2,...,435. j = ), we first need to calculate the size of the capacity in 
each municipality. The health care supplied in Norwegian hospitals can roughly be 
divided in three: capacity at county level, capacity at regional level and capacity at 
national level. 
(1)
j S  is the capacity of health care at the county level estimated for each 
municipality ( j ). 
(2)
j S  is a measure of the capacity at the health region level, estimated 
for each municipality ( j ). Finally, 
(3)
j S  measures the capacity at the national level  
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estimated for every municipality  j  in Norway. We also have to take account of the size 
of the population the capacity is expected to serve. Therefore, we divided 
(1)
j S  by k P , the 
population in countyk , 
(2)
j S by  r P , the population in region r , and 
(3)
j S  by P , the total 
population in Norway, and obtained the estimated ratio “capacity per head”.  
 
A distance measure was also needed when modeling the attractiveness of health care. 
InfoMap Norge AS calculated the distance ( ij c ) between residential zone i and 
destination  j , measured as travel time by car.  ( ) ij f c  expresses the effect of distance on 
access. The first order derivative is assumed to be negative  ( ) 0 ij fc ′ < , and the second 
order derivative is positive:  ( ) 0 ij fc ′′ > . We found it troublesome to choose the actual 
decay function  () f ⋅  to be used . Haggett, Cliff and Frey  (1974) describe among others 
the possible functional form:  ()
c fc e
α β − = , where c is the estimated distance, and α  
and  β  are parameters to be estimated. With high values of β  we will obtain high 
elasticity with respect to distance, while low values of β  will give higher weights to 
longer distances. The chosen values of the two parameters are  0 α =  and  0.2 β = , and 
equal to the assumptions in Carr-Hill et al. (1994). Hence, we assume  ()
0,2 ij c
ij fc e
− = , 






















The joint accessibility  ikr A  for the residents in municipalityiin county k in region r can 
now be expressed as: 





k r n n
ikr j ij j ij j ij
jj j kr
Ac S f d S f d S f d
PP P == =

=+ + 
 ∑∑ ∑ .  
 
According to Kopperud (2002) the accessibility index shows that access to health care is 
superior in high population density areas.  
 
The index is standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1, and is interpreted as 
the number of standard deviations from the mean. Comparing the perceived  
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accessibility measured as physician man-years in hospitals, we find that the cities of 
Oslo, Tromsø and Trondheim are the three municipalities with the best-perceived 
accessibility. Compared with the average municipality, Oslo has 2.9 standard deviations 
better access to specialized care. The population density is 1192.5 persons per km
2 in 
Oslo. The estimated accessibility is 2.6 for Tromsø and 2.5 for Trondheim. The index 
ranges from the capital Oslo, with the best-perceived access to hospital care, to Loppa, a 
municipality far north in Finnmark County where the population density is only 2.1 
persons per km
2. Loppa has a perceived access to hospital care that is 2.7 standard 
deviations lower than the average accessibility in Norway. The perceived access to 
specialized care in hospitals, measured as the number of hospital beds, is best for 
Trondheim, Skien and Førde. The index is respectively 2.1, 2.0 and 1.9. Again, Loppa is 
the municipality with the lowest perceived accessibility. The estimated accessibility in 
Loppa is 2.8 standard deviations lower than the average accessibility. The third 
accessibility index measures access to private specialist care in an office setting. Oslo 
obtained the best-perceived access to private specialized health care. The estimated 
accessibility is 6.3 standard deviations higher than the average accessibility. The 
estimated accessibility for both Tønsberg and Bærum is 2.1. The worst perceived access 
to specialized health care is again estimated for a municipality in Finnmark County, this 
time Hasvik. The estimated accessibility in Hasvik, with a population density at 2.2 
persons per km
2, is 1.5 standard deviations below the average municipality accessibility. 
 
 
 